Economic proposal

Product first, token later. Option 1: a paid capability router with a receipt per request, and no token. Option 3: a contributor programme, only after Option 1 shows real surplus.

The 2026-11-05 protocol pass (owner brief 20466) adds the proposed mechanism in plain language: chapter 19, Mechanism and sources, and the pages Token, Demand and Reserve. All of it is PROPOSED; this chapter’s facts stand unchanged.

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Three mechanisms were designed and scored against fifteen criteria. The scores are one analyst’s judgements with cited evidence, out of 150. They favour doing less, and the weak point of the winner is stated below.

Option 2: a reserve-aligned TAON token and TAON/TAO pool, documented and gated behind conditions nothing today meets. The weak point of Option 1 is that willingness to pay a router markup is unmeasured.

This is a separate, simpler picture from the Route Decision on the homepage. The Route Decision shows how one request is routed today. This loop shows how paid usage could be settled into a proposed TAO reserve, and none of it runs. It stops there.

Future reserve use is undecided. Potential uses require a published policy, custody design and measurable connection to product operation. Nothing here says that holding TAO improves routing, creates demand, rewards holders or earns yield.

A token market is not a step in this loop, because trading a token creates no productive revenue. Customers hold refundable credit and their receipts, not a claim on the reserve.

No split of eligible surplus is published. Shares are not decided and none will be shown until the owner approves them with supporting evidence. At today’s volume every share would be $0, so the team is funded outside the mechanism for the foreseeable future.

The earlier universal price of $0.003 per answer is withdrawn. Prices are set per capability (see Pricing and accounts), and the figures below are modelled from them, not measured.

Break-even in short: roughly $400 of pack sales a month at the proposed capability prices to cover running costs, and roughly $7,200 to also pay one developer $6,000 a month (PROPOSED prices, modelled, not measured). The measured provider cost of a text answer, $0.000126, is calculated from 20 answered requests, none of them reported by the provider. Below break-even the product acquires no TAO, so the loop is mostly symbolic at small volume. The calculator that produces these figures is tested so that revenue cannot come from request volume alone, failed requests earn nothing, refunds reduce revenue, provider costs come off first and TAO bought can never exceed the funded surplus.

The constitution (docs/TAONIC-CONSTITUTION.md, locked on 2026-09-25) proposes a different design in six places. The differences are listed, not applied: only the project owner can change the constitution.

Each stage needs its exit evidence before the next begins. None has a date.

• A right that improves routing for its user, not only a fee stream
• Three months of reconciled paid accounting, reviewed externally
• Counsel has reviewed it in writing
• The counter-asset identity and redemption are confirmed
• Measured TAO depth on Robinhood Chain
• An independent audit with a published report
• The owner’s written approval for that specific deployment

The details are in 13 TAON token proposal. No legal or tax conclusion is drawn anywhere in this proposal; the questions for qualified counsel are listed in the concept book.